Many organizations, individuals, and governments are taking up arms against extremism. The following reports are ones we believe bring unique value to the conversation. If you would like us to share your work or have other suggestions for research we should share with the counterextremism community, please contact us via the Join the Conversation Page<\/a>.<\/p>\n January 2020<\/strong><\/p>\n Jeff Seldin, \u201cIn Syria, Captured Islamic State Fighters, Followers Going Home<\/a>,\u201d Voice of <\/em>America<\/em>, January 23, 2020.<\/p>\n The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) are currently in the process of employing return and reintegration initiatives in order to allow dozens of captured <\/em>ISIS<\/em> fighters and affiliated persons, often women and children, to return to their previous homes. The process has been arduous and lacks some of the resources necessary to ensure successful deradicalization, however U.N and <\/em>U.S.<\/em> officials are cautiously optimistic that the SDF\u2019s process will be effective. <\/em><\/p>\n Jared Szuba, \u201cIntelligence \u2018ambiguity\u2019 raises questions over ISIS capability in Iraq and Syria, US-led Coalition says<\/a>,\u201d The Defense Post<\/em>, January 23, 2020.<\/p>\n Despite drawing down forces in <\/em>Syria<\/em>, the U.S.-led coalition in the region is cautiously optimistic about a decrease in <\/em>ISIS<\/em>\u2019 capabilities. Although there is concern that <\/em>ISIS<\/em> is executing \u201cstrategic patience,\u201d <\/em>ISIS<\/em> has not yet rebounded to control territory or take advantage of unrest in <\/em>Iraq<\/em>. It is possible that this lack of activity indicates that <\/em>ISIS<\/em> is experiencing weakened organizational capabilities.\u00a0 <\/em><\/p>\n \u201cBoko Haram: EU appraises FG, military\u2019s counter-insurgency operations<\/a>,\u201d Legit.ng<\/em>, January 23, 2020.<\/p>\n The European Union Centre for Human Rights Protection (EUCHRP) has commended the Nigerian government and its military for its recent progress in counter-insurgency operations in a report signed by the executive director of the Luxembourg-based centre. Although the EUCHRP praised <\/em>Nigeria<\/em>\u2019s efforts, it recommended that the country remain vigilant in its efforts to continue to counter Boko Haram\u2019s insurgency<\/em>.<\/p>\n Vanessa Gera, \u201cIslamic leaders make \u2018groundbreaking\u2019 visit to Aushwitz<\/a>,\u201d Yahoo News<\/em>, January 23, 2020.<\/p>\n Senior Muslim leaders joined members of the American Jewish Committee in a tour of the Auschwitz-Birkenau memorial four days before the 75th<\/sup> anniversary of the camp\u2019s liberation. The inter-faith tour demonstrates an ongoing effort by <\/em>Saudi Arabia<\/em> and other Islamic <\/em>Gulf states<\/em> to be viewed as moderate and modern rather than conservative nations dictated by strict religious adherence. The outreach by senior Muslim leaders also highlights the broader efforts by moderate Islamic states to establish ties with <\/em>Israel<\/em> against <\/em>Iran<\/em>. <\/em><\/p>\n Kyle Rempfer, \u201c101st<\/sup> Airborne deployed to Manda Bay after al-Shabab attack<\/a>,\u201d Army Times<\/em>, January 23, 2020.<\/p>\n Soldier\u2019s from the 101st<\/sup> Airborne Division deployed to <\/em>Manda Bay<\/em>, <\/em>Kenya<\/em> as part of the <\/em>U.S.<\/em> effort to bolster the airfield and surrounding region\u2019s security after the January 5 attack by al-Shabab. Al-Shabab remains active in the region and this recent attack highlights the tenuous nature of security in <\/em>Kenya<\/em>. The deployment should serve as an indication that the <\/em>United States<\/em> remains committed to its mission in <\/em>East Africa<\/em>, despite al-Shabab warning that <\/em>America<\/em> will abandon African troops \u201cwhen the fighting gets hard.\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n Hussein Ibish, \u201cLebanon\u2019s New Government Is Set Up to Fail<\/a>,\u201d Yahoo News, <\/em>January 23, 2020.<\/p>\n Lebanon\u2019s new government, comprised primarily of pro-Hezbollah politicians, is likely to fail and perhaps was set up to do so by its own allies. Iranian-backed Hezbollah traditionally plays an influential, but not responsible, role in <\/em>Beirut<\/em>\u2019s government, and its new position may lend itself to being held accountable for <\/em>Lebanon<\/em>\u2019s current state of dysfunction. Consequently, Hezbollah may intend for the current government to fail in hopes of returning to status quo, but protestors, currently demanding radical reform, may prevent such backsliding. Both situations lend themselves to continued instability and dysfunction in <\/em>Lebanon<\/em>. <\/em><\/p>\n Lolita C. Baldor, \u201cUS general says troop surge in Middle East may not end soon<\/a>,\u201d Yahoo News<\/em>, January 23, 2020.<\/p>\n Although the <\/em>United States<\/em> has recently indicated that <\/em>China<\/em> and <\/em>Russia<\/em> are \u201cmission number one,\u201d the <\/em>United States<\/em> has increased its troop presence in the <\/em>Middle East<\/em> by more than 20,000 troops in the past eight months. In addition to stabilization efforts, the <\/em>Afghanistan<\/em> War, and missions against <\/em>ISIS<\/em>, the recent crisis with <\/em>Iran<\/em> further highlights the pressing need for troops in the region. Importantly, the increase in troop numbers in the region may demonstrate that, despite rhetoric to the contrary, the <\/em>Middle East<\/em> remains the primary concern for the <\/em>United States<\/em>.<\/em><\/p>\n Brett McGurk, \u201cThe Cost of an Incoherent Foreign Policy<\/a>,\u201d Foreign Affairs<\/em>, January 22, 2020.<\/p>\n Using a comparison to Dwight Eisenhower, McGurk critiques the Trump administration\u2019s \u201cincoherent foreign policy,\u201d arguing that its rhetoric and its actions are misaligned. McGurk suggests that the crisis with <\/em>Iran<\/em> should \u201cdemand a return to\u2026basic principles of sound foreign policy,\u201d with an emphasis on clear objectives and the necessary allocation of resources to meet those aims. <\/em><\/p>\n Bill Roggio, \u201cTaliban admits \u2018peace\u2019 negotiations with U.S. are merely means to withdraw \u2018foreign forces<\/a>,\u2019\u201d FDD\u2019s Long War Journal<\/em>, January 21, 2020.<\/p>\n In its most recent commentary entitled, \u201cPowerless shall always remain shareless\u2026!,\u201d the Taliban admitted that the peace talks with the <\/em>United States<\/em> are a facilitator to ensure the withdrawal of foreign forces from <\/em>Afghanistan<\/em>. The Taliban also used the statement to demonstrate its ongoing disregard for the validity of the current Afghan government. The United States should seriously consider the Taliban\u2019s overt indication that it is using peace talks for its own ends before continuing negotations. <\/em><\/p>\n Caleb Weiss, \u201cHouthis kill over 100 Yemeni soldiers in missile, drone attack on base<\/a>,\u201d FDD\u2019s Long War Journal<\/em>, January 20, 2020.<\/p>\n A coordinated attack against a Yemeni military training base and targeting the base\u2019s mosque killed more than 100 soldiers. Although the Iranian-backed Houthis are believed to be responsible for the attack, there has been no formal statement of responsibility. Although missile and drone strikes have slowed since the announcement of ceasefires last fall, this attack is one of the deadliest in the Yemeni conflict since 2014. <\/em><\/p>\n Joe Truzman, \u201cThe ISIS insurgency in the Sinai continues despite Egyptian Army efforts<\/a>,\u201d FDD\u2019s Long War Journal<\/em>, January 17, 2020.<\/p>\n Despite the death of <\/em>ISIS<\/em>\u2019 leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, and efforts by the Egyptian army, <\/em>ISIS<\/em>\u2019 Sinai \u201cprovince\u201d remains active and loyal to the central group. The terrain in northern Egypt has allowed the group to effectively carry out hit-and-run attacks, even with suspected assistance by Israel. Importantly, the group\u2019s activity and effectiveness in northern Egypt demonstrates that although its central \u201ccaliphate\u201d has been destroyed, ISIS remains a potent threat in the region.<\/em><\/p>\n Guy Taylor, \u201cIran expands support for Taliban, targets U.S. troops in Afghanistan<\/a>,\u201d The Washington Times, <\/em>January 20, 2020.<\/p>\n In the wake of escalated tensions between the <\/em>United States<\/em> and <\/em>Iran<\/em>, experts fear that <\/em>Afghanistan<\/em> could provide the location of the next proxy war between <\/em>Washington<\/em> and <\/em>Tehran<\/em>. Tehran has already had ties to the Taliban in the past decade and could look to use that connection to inhibit U.S.-Taliban peace talks and prevent the United States from disentangling itself from the region. Conversely, it is possible that Tehran takes seriously Secretary of State Mike Pompeo\u2019s warnings that America will respond directly against Iran if it attempts to use proxies to engage the United States.<\/em><\/p>\n Norman Friedman, \u201cThe Case for Killing Soleimani \u2013 A Lesson in Deterrence<\/a>,\u201d United States Naval Institute,<\/em> January 2020.<\/p>\n Friedman provides a brief overview of the integral role that the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corp (IRGC) plays in protecting the Iranian regime of Ayatollah Khomeini. By comparing the role of the IRGC to the German SS in World War II, the article emphasizes the importance of the IRGC, and by extension General Qasem Soleimani, in ensuring the ability of the current regime to remain in power. It claims that the drone strike that killed Soleimani was a necessary act of deterrence, intended to indicate to Iran that the United States is both willing to and capable of striking the \u201cbulwark of the Iranian regime.\u201d <\/em><\/p>\n November 2019<\/strong><\/p>\n \u201cAmerican Kurds take up Syria fight as Erdogan visits Trump<\/a>,\u201d BBC News<\/em>, November 17, 2019.<\/p>\n In the wake of President Trump\u2019s decision to withdraw American troops from <\/em>Syria<\/em>, <\/em>America<\/em>\u2019s Kurdish population has come together to protest the continued abandonment of the ethnic group. <\/em><\/p>\n Sommer Brokaw, \u201cCar bomb in Syria kills at least 15<\/a>,\u201d United Press International<\/em>, November 16, 2019.<\/p>\n A car bomb in the Turkish-backed al-Bab district killed at least fifteen, with some Turkish sources indicating that the toll could be as high as eighteen. Turkish officials have blamed Kurdish forces in the region and made comparisons between the attack and those by ISIS. <\/em><\/p>\n Craig Nelson and Ehsanullah Amiri, \u201cStalled Prisoner Swap Slows Steps Towards Resuming Talks in Afghan War<\/a>,\u201d The Wall Street Journal<\/em>, November 16, 2019.<\/p>\n A prisoner exchange between the Afghan government and the Taliban, which was intended to swap three members of the Haqqani network for two English teachers abducted in Kabul in 2016, was postponed after attacks by the Taliban in the Logar province and Kabul in the days leading up to the exchange. The prisoner swap was intended to help restart peace negotiations in Afghanistan. <\/em><\/p>\n Karen DeYoung, \u201cAllies seek reassurances from Trump administration as U.S. policy on Syria shifts<\/a>,\u201d The Washington Post<\/em>, November 15, 2019.<\/p>\n Following President Trump\u2019s abrupt decision to withdraw <\/em>U.S.<\/em> forces from <\/em>Syria<\/em>, <\/em>U.S.<\/em> allies in the coalition against <\/em>ISIS<\/em> has sought reassurance that the <\/em>United States<\/em> will not shift policies again without consultation. The withdrawal has already altered the regional environment, with <\/em>Russia<\/em> gaining an increased role in the region and <\/em>ISIS<\/em> remaining a significant threat. <\/em><\/p>\n October 2019<\/strong><\/p>\n Adam Nossiter, \u201cHow ISIS Changed France<\/a>,\u201d The <\/em>New York<\/em> Times<\/em>, October 31, 2019.<\/p>\n The French response to the death of <\/em>ISIS<\/em> leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, was muted, demonstrating the heightened state of concern in <\/em>France<\/em> towards Islamic terrorism. Nossiter highlights the impact of the ISIS attacks on French culture, but further indicates that the divide between French society and its Muslim minority existed prior to the influx of radicalism as a result of ISIS attacks.\u00a0<\/em><\/p>\n Ayaz Gul, \u201cAfghan Government Links Peace Talks With Taliban to One-Month Cease-Fire<\/a>,\u201d Voice of <\/em>America<\/em>, October 29, 2019.<\/p>\n Following President Trump\u2019s end to <\/em>U.S.<\/em> negotiations with the Taliban in September, the Afghan government has attempted to take over the peace talks that it had been left out of during the U.S.-Taliban exchange. Under its new plan, the Afghan government will only consider negotiations after a one-month cease-fire intended to demonstrate that the Taliban retains the authority to control its widespread troops and ultimately carry out any future peace deal. <\/em><\/p>\n Thomas Joscelyn, \u201cAbu Bakr Al-Baghdadi killed himself during raid, U.S. says<\/a>,\u201d FDD\u2019s Long War Journal<\/em>, October 27, 2019.<\/p>\n Joscelyn provides a brief background of the history of <\/em>ISIS<\/em> and al-Baghdadi in the wake of his suicide during a <\/em>U.S.<\/em> raid in northern <\/em>Syria<\/em>.<\/em><\/p>\n Caleb Weiss, \u201cAl Qaeda leader reported killed in Tunisia<\/a>,\u201d FDD\u2019s Long War Journal<\/em>, October 20, 2019.<\/p>\n A senior leader of al-Qaeda\u2019s Tunisian branch, Uqba bin Nafi Battalion (KUBN), was reportedly killed in a Tunisian military operation on October 20th<\/sup>. However, this claim has not been verified by KUBN and a similar false claim in 2017 raises questions about the validity of the Tunisian report. If accurate, the death marks another blow against KUBN, while simultaneously signaling the breadth of al-Qaeda influence across the region.<\/em><\/p>\n